Role of External State and Non-State Actors in Creating Challenges to Internal Security

Role of External State and Non-State Actors in Creating Challenges to Internal Security

Introduction

Internal security challenges in India have evolved into a complex phenomenon where external actors—both state and non-state entities—actively exploit vulnerabilities within Indian borders. The distinction between internal and external threats has blurred considerably as hostile neighbors, non-state actors, and international criminal networks operate in coordinated fashion to destabilize India’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and socio-economic development. This multidimensional challenge requires a comprehensive understanding of mechanisms, actors, and geopolitical implications.

I. External State Actors: Mechanisms and Threats

A. Pakistan’s Institutional State Support to Terrorism

Strategic Policy Framework: Pakistan’s military establishment, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has institutionalized terrorism as an instrument of state policy against India. This is not sporadic interference but systematic engagement with designated terrorist organizations.

Key Terrorist Proxies:

• Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): UN-designated terrorist organization that has carried out multiple attacks including the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks (166 deaths), the 2019 Pulwama attack (40 CRPF personnel killed), and the 2025 Pahalgam attack (26 civilian deaths)

• Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM): Responsible for the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing and various Kashmir Valley operations

• Hizbul Mujahideen (HM): Active in Kashmir Valley with estimated 500-800 active militants

• Haqqani Network: While primarily focused on Afghanistan, provides coordination between Pakistani military and Taliban operations, with indirect implications for Kashmir through shared tactical expertise

Operational Support Structure:
Pakistan provides comprehensive support including:

• Military training at dedicated camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir

• Arms and ammunition sourcing through PLA connections

• Safe havens and logistics infrastructure

• Financial remittances through hawala networks (estimated ₹80 crores transferred by HM through formal channels over many years)

• Cross-border infiltration facilitation across the Line of Control (LoC)

Data on Cross-Border Terrorism: Between 1988-2019, approximately 44,840 terrorist incidents occurred in Kashmir alone, with 23,779 casualties (52.5% terrorists, 14.4% security forces, 32.9% civilians). During 2004-2014, India witnessed 7,217 terrorist incidents; this decreased to 2,242 incidents (2014-2024), reflecting improved counterterrorism efforts.

B. China’s Multi-Dimensional Support to Insurgencies

Ideological Alignment with Naxal-Maoist Movement:
China’s support to India’s left-wing extremist movements stems from ideological affinity and strategic interest in fragmenting India. The Communist Party of China (CPC) publicly endorsed India’s Naxalite movement, calling it “a peal of spring thunder crashing over the land of India” (People’s Daily, July 5, 1967), immediately following China’s 1962 war victory against India.

Arms Supply Network:

• Intelligence Bureau reports confirm Chinese arms including automatic weapons, communication devices, and manufacturing equipment supplied via Myanmar border routes

• Maoists have developed seven Technical Research Arms Manufacturing Units (TRAM) manned by 15 technical experts, with capacity to produce rocket launchers, grenade launchers, assault rifles, and mortars

• Chinese-made small arms and radio sets frequently recovered from Maoist hideouts across Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Andhra Pradesh

Support to Northeast Insurgencies:

• ULFA (Anti-Talks) leader Paresh Barua operates from Ruili, a Chinese border town in Yunnan Province, with direct coordination with Chinese liaison offices

• Approximately 2,500 militants from various Northeast insurgent groups (NSCN-K: 1,000+; PLA: 260; UNLF: 230; ULFA-I: 200+) maintained in Myanmar bases with Chinese support

• Chinese agencies facilitate weapons procurement and provide strategic guidance

• Chinese officials promised weapons and logistics to various insurgent groups in exchange for destabilizing Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as “South Tibet”

Operational Coordination: China coordinates multi-front destabilization by linking Maoist groups, Kashmir terrorists, and Northeast insurgents into coordinated anti-India operations through intelligence agencies and arms supply networks.

C. Other State Actors’ Involvement

Bangladesh:

• Provides sanctuary to various separatist groups despite official denials

• Porous borders facilitate cross-border narcotics and arms trafficking

• ISI has established operational bases in Bangladeshi territories for radicalization campaigns

Myanmar:

• Post-2021 coup instability created ungoverned zones where 170,000+ Myanmar nationals have sought refuge in Indian border districts

• Approximately 2,500 Indian Northeast militants operate from bases in Myanmar’s Sagaing Division and other frontier areas

• Chinese, Taliban, and other external actors use Myanmar territory for logistics and training

Nepal:

• Porous 1,751-kilometer border enables infiltration and sanctuary provision

• ISI has established extensive network through madrassas and Islamic charities in Terai region since late 1995

• Approximately $3 million+ pumped into Nepal for madrassa construction by ISI and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) by 1995

• Radical preachers from Pakistan and Lebanon operate in Nepal border regions

II. Non-State Actors: Organizational and Transnational Dimensions

A. International Terrorist Organizations

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS):

• Designated terrorist organization with presence across Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India

• Conducts suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, and small-arms attacks

• Goals include establishing Islamic caliphate in Indian subcontinent

• Has ties with LeT, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other groups

• Active recruitment and operational planning in 2025

Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL):

• Established operational cells in multiple Indian cities

• 2024 Bengaluru cafe bombing conducted by four ISIS members (nine casualties)

• Recruitment through encrypted messaging apps and gaming platforms

• Competing with Al-Qaeda for regional dominance and recruitment networks

B. Pakistan-Based Terrorist Organizations with Independent Operational Capacity

LeT/TRF Operations:

• Resistance Front (TRF), a LeT proxy, claimed responsibility for 2025 Pahalgam attack (26 deaths)

• Maintains active command structure in Kashmir Valley independent of ISI direction at operational level

• 2024 Reasi attack on Hindu pilgrims: 9 deaths, 41 injured

JeM Operations:

• Autonomous operational planning capability alongside state coordination

• Network extends to recruitment and training in Kashmir Valley

• Maintains separate financial channels and safe house infrastructure

C. Criminal-Terrorist Nexus: Narco-Terrorism and Transnational Crime Networks

Drug Trafficking-Terrorism Linkage:

• Proceeds from drug trafficking increasingly finance terrorism and armed groups (INCB Annual Report 2023, UNODC findings)

• Afghanistan produces 70% of world’s illicit opium; nearly 40% reaches South Asian markets

• India emerged as key market for opiates with rising trafficking incidents

Maritime Drug Trafficking Routes:

• Afghan heroin (200+ kg seizures common): Afghanistan → Pakistan → Iran coast → Arabian Sea → Indian maritime zones (Kerala, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu)

• 2022 October: 200 kg Afghan heroin seized off Kerala coast from Iranian vessel

• 2022 September: Two containers with ~3 tons heroin seized at Mundra Port, Gujarat

• 2024 November: 6 tons methamphetamine worth ₹36,000 crores seized off Andaman & Nicobar Islands

• South route now preferred over land routes due to enhanced border security

Hawala Networks:

• Estimated ₹80 crores transferred by HM through hawala for Kashmir terror operations

• Mumbai 2006 train bombings financed through hawala transfers from Pakistan

• Pakistani operatives route funds through multiple hawala operators in Gulf countries, Middle East, and South Asia

• Transactions typically ₹1 lakh or less to avoid detection

• 11 active NIA cases investigating hawala-routed terrorism financing

Key Drug Cartels:

• Haji Saleem (Balochistan-based): ISI-backed Pakistani national orchestrating heroin consignments to Mumbai

• African nationals: Occasional heroin trafficking through maritime routes

• Afghan nationals: Methamphetamine trafficking network (312.5 kg methamphetamine seized in Delhi involving Afghan nationals, 2024)

• Central Asian women trafficking networks: Organized trafficking for sexual exploitation

III. Foreign Funding and Radicalization Infrastructure

A. Financial Networks Supporting Insurgencies

Separatist Movements Funding Evidence (NIA Investigation Findings, 2019):

• Kashmiri separatist leaders (Shabir Shah, Asiya Andrabi, Masarat Alam, Yasin Malik) received funds from Pakistan and UAE-based sources

• JRL (Joint Resistance Leadership) collected funds from business community and foreign sources

• Separated leaders admitted to using foreign funds for personal enrichment (properties, education abroad)

• Evidence collected from High Commission of Pakistan in Delhi, ISI channels, and UAE-based businessman transfers

• Funds used to organize violent agitations, economic shutdowns, and anti-India activities

Madrassa Network Radicalization (India-Nepal Border):

• ISI-funded madrassas established across Nepal Terai since 1995

• Radical curriculum teaching jihadi ideology in primary classes

• Undocumented students enrolled with fake Indian identification documents

• Foreign havala money flowing through Nepal-Bihar-Muzaffarpur corridor

• Recent investigations: Razzak Mosque (Sunsari), madrassas in Mahottari, Sitamarhi, Muzaffarpur receiving continuous ISI funding

• Radical preachers from Pakistan and Lebanon conducting recruitment and ideological indoctrination

Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) Role (LeT’s Charity Wing):

• Originally founded as Markaz Dawa-e-Islam (MDI) in 1980s as LeT’s charity front

• Infrastructure for recruitment through SIMI (Students Islamic Movement of India) and Indian Mujahideen

• Recent vectors through People’s Front of India (PFI) with founder E. AbuBacker (Kozhikode, Kerala)

• Operates madrassas teaching distorted Islamic ideology across Indo-Nepal border

• Coordinates with ISI for identifying recruitment targets and operational planning

B. Ideological Radicalization Through Information Warfare

Social Media Recruitment Mechanisms:

• Digital platforms enable rapid radicalization compared to traditional methods

• Encrypted messaging apps (Telegram, WhatsApp) and gaming platforms used for recruitment

• AI-generated content, fake images, and manipulated videos for propaganda dissemination

• Algorithms isolate users into extremist echo chambers

Coordinated Information Operations:

• Pakistan-coordinated information warfare during Operation Sindoor (April 2025): AI-generated content, deepfakes, mislabeled war footage disseminated across YouTube, Instagram, X platforms

• Objective: sow confusion, distort military operations reality, manipulate international perceptions

• India’s reactive digital response gradually evolved to proactive transparency and centralized information control

IV. Geographic and Operational Sanctuaries

A. Myanmar Border Instability and Ungoverned Spaces

Sanctuary Provision:

• NSCN-K headquarters in Taga, Sagaing Division until recently destroyed in joint India-Myanmar operations

• 500+ Indian Northeast militants regrouped across Myanmar

• Dense forests and porous terrain enable cross-border sanctuary provision

• ULFA (I), PLA, NDFB-S maintain operational bases for training, regrouping, and staging attacks

Cross-Border Operations:

• 2015 Chandel attack: NSCN-K militants killed 18 Indian Army soldiers

• Indian Special Forces conducted cross-border operation destroying two NSCN-K camps, killing insurgents

• Recent Operation Sunrise (2025): Joint India-Myanmar counter-insurgency operations destroyed cross-border insurgent camps

Narcotics Trafficking Corridor:

• Golden Triangle (Myanmar-Laos-Thailand) methamphetamine routes: 236 tons seized in East-Southeast Asia in 2024 (24% increase over 2023)

• Indian maritime zones targeted as distribution points for Southeast Asian drug networks

• Coastal states (Gujarat, Maharashtra, Kerala, Tamil Nadu) increasingly vulnerable

B. Pakistan-Administered Kashmir as Operational Base

Terrorist Camp Infrastructure:

• FBI satellite imagery documented multiple terrorist training camps in Pakistan

• LeT commander called for jihad from Pakistan-administered Kashmir just before Pahalgam attack (April 2025)

• Headquarters of various terrorist groups: Hizbul Mujahideen, LeT, JeM, SIMI, Indian Mujahideen

• Media outlets in Pakistan-administered Kashmir require permission from Pakistan’s Minister for Kashmiri Affairs (control mechanism)

• Estimates suggest 500-800 active HM militants in Valley with continuous operational capability

C. Afghan Territory and Taliban Coordination

Taliban-Pakistan-Terrorist Group Nexus:

• Pakistan’s military supports Taliban as part of national strategy to control Afghanistan

• ISI shelters Taliban leadership and coordinates with group commanders

• Haqqani Network: ISI-backed terrorist organization serving as key conduit for cross-border terror operations

• Taliban provides sanctuary to TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), AQIS, and other groups

• Covert proxy war through suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, and mass casualty attacks

V. Specific Operational Mechanisms

A. Cyber Warfare and Critical Infrastructure Attacks

State-Sponsored Attacks:

• AIIMS Delhi ransomware attack (2023): Major government hospital compromised

• Karnataka Kaveri 2.0 property portal attack: State infrastructure targeted

• Pakistani hackers regularly target government websites

• 138% increase in cyber attacks on Indian government (2019-2023)

• Vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure across power, water, telecommunications sectors

Capability Asymmetry Challenge:

• India lacks full indigenization in hardware and software cybersecurity tools

• Dependency on foreign technology creates vulnerability to state actors

B. Cross-Border Infiltration Techniques

Land Border Infiltration:

• LoC crossings in Jammu & Kashmir with sophisticated route knowledge

• International Border crossing attempts across Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat

• Thar Desert used as hiddenunction route for buried weapons and supplies

• Timing coordinated with ceasefire violations to provide cover

Maritime Infiltration:

• Rann of Kutch marshlands and creeks provide ideal hideaways for armed boats

• Mother ships offload personnel and materials to smaller boats in coastal waters

• Fishing vessels used as cover for personnel and weapons transport

• EEZ penetration by Pakistani-flagged vessels with arms and narcotics

C. Terror Financing Through Legitimate Channels

Misuse of Religious Institutions:

• Donations through mosques and Islamic charities channeled to terror groups

• Charitable NGO registrations used to transfer foreign funds

• Banks and formal financial channels sometimes exploited despite regulatory frameworks

• FEMA violations and COFEPOSA cases document systematic terror financing

VI. Scale and Impact of Terrorism

Statistical Overview (2023-2025)

Regional Breakdown

Jammu & Kashmir:

• Epicenter of Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism

• 2025 Pahalgam attack: 26 deaths

• 2024 Reasi attack: 9 deaths, 41 injured

• Continuous infiltration attempts across LoC

Northeast India:

• Multiple insurgent groups operating from Myanmar sanctuaries

• China-backed insurgencies: ULFA (I), NSCN-K, PLA, NDFB

• Enhanced narcotics trafficking: northeast becoming consumption hub

Western Coast (Gujarat, Maharashtra, Kerala):

• Maritime drug trafficking gateway

• 2022: 3-ton heroin seizure (Mundra Port)

• Increasing methamphetamine seizures

• Fishing vessels converted into smuggling platforms

VII. Non-Traditional Security Threats

A. Organized Criminal Networks with Transnational Reach

Dawood Ibrahim Gang:

• Countrywide network with foreign bases (Dubai since 1985)

• Engaged in drug/arms trafficking, smuggling, extortion

• Links with Pakistani military and ISI operatives

• Money laundering through formal and informal channels

Transnational Drug Trafficking Networks:

• Romanian nationals involved in financial fraud (Goa)

• Pakistani elements facilitate maritime arms/narcotics smuggling

• Afghan nationals: heroin and methamphetamine trafficking

• Chinese elements: methamphetamine production and trafficking

B. Environmental Exploitation and Resource Trafficking

Cross-Border Timber and Jade Smuggling:

• Myanmar-India border: armed groups tax cross-border trade

• Myanmar instability (post-2021 coup) enabled illicit resource extraction

• Insurgent groups finance operations through resource trafficking

• Undermines sovereign control over border regions

VIII. Asymmetric Warfare Dimensions

A. Hybrid Terrorism and Virtual Terrorist Outfits

Evolution in Terrorist Methods:

• Traditional hierarchical structures replaced by decentralized, virtual cells

• Social media-enabled recruitment reduces radicalization time

• Lone-wolf attacks with minimal central coordination

• 2024 Delhi car explosion (November): Investigation ongoing, suspect from ghaziabad-based Indian terrorist group

Digital Infrastructure Exploitation:

• Gaming platforms used for recruitment screening and communication

• Encrypted messaging apps enable secure command and control

• Cryptocurrency used for anonymous fund transfers (emerging threat)

B. Economic and Social Disruption as Strategic Objectives

Kashmir Valley Disruption (2016 Model):

• JRL-organized violent agitations created 4-month economic shutdown

• Protest calendars distributed coordinating mass demonstrations

• Deaths and injuries to civilians and security forces during protests

• Economic losses and psychological impact on population stability

Regional Destabilization Spillover:

• Terrorism diverts development resources to security spending

• Investor confidence reduction impacts economic growth

• Population displacement (Kashmiri Pandits: significant migration)

• Healthcare and education disruption in conflict zones

IX. Countermeasures and Strategic Responses

A. Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives

Cross-Border Operations:

• Joint India-Myanmar counter-insurgency operations (Operation Sunrise)

• Destruction of NSCN-K headquarters and multiple insurgent camps

• Real-time intelligence sharing with Myanmar military

Regional Cooperation:

• India-Central Asia security dialogue: countering terrorism, radicalisation, narcotics trafficking cooperation

• BIMSTEC framework expansion for non-traditional security threats

• Shanghai Cooperation Organisation coordination on counterterrorism

B. Institutional and Legal Framework

Terror Financing Investigation:

• NIA investigating 11 active hawala-routed terrorism financing cases

• FEMA and Money Laundering Act enforcement

• COFEPOSA detention powers for terror suspects

• Financial Action Task Force (FATF) alignment

Border Security Enhancement:

• Fencing along India-Pakistan border (partial completion: significant gaps remain)

• Scrapped Free Movement Regime with Myanmar

• National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam identifying illegal migrants

• Enhanced coastal surveillance and port security

C. Operational Counterterrorism Success

Metrics (2014-2024 Period):

• 70% reduction in civilian deaths from terrorism

• 50% reduction in security personnel casualties

• Dismantlement of multiple terrorist hideouts and training camps

• Arrest and prosecution of terror funding networks

X. Emerging and Persistent Challenges

A. Technological Advancement in Terrorist Capabilities

• Drone usage in cross-border infiltration attempts

• AI-enhanced deepfake propaganda for narrative manipulation

• Cyber-enabled coordination between geographically dispersed cells

• Encrypted communication platforms beyond law enforcement access

B. Climate-Driven Migration and Security Implications

• Myanmar instability causing refugee flows into Northeast India

• Border zone population dynamics altering traditional security dynamics

• Resource scarcity competition among border communities

• Ungoverned space expansion in Myanmar-India frontier

C. Ideological Proliferation in Academic and Urban Spaces

• University radicalization by Chinese-backed leftist organizations

• Urban terror cells with technical education and cyber capabilities

• Social media-enabled recruitment targeting educated youth

• De-centralization making identification and interdiction difficult

Conclusion

The role of external state and non-state actors in creating challenges to India’s internal security represents a complex, evolving threat landscape where traditional definitions of war and peace have dissolved. Pakistan’s institutionalized use of terrorism as state policy, China’s multi-pronged destabilization strategy through ideological and military support, and the autonomous operations of international terrorist organizations create overlapping vulnerabilities that require adaptive, multi-dimensional responses.

The nexus between legitimate criminal activities (narcotics trafficking), financial systems (hawala networks), and terrorism finance demonstrates the transnational nature of these threats. Geographic sanctuaries in Myanmar, Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and ungoverned Afghan territories provide operational infrastructure that traditional border security struggles to interdict.

However, statistical evidence from 2014-2024 demonstrates that coordinated counterterrorism operations, intelligence-driven interventions, and bilateral cooperation mechanisms can substantially reduce terrorist incident rates and casualties. Continued emphasis on maritime domain awareness, cyber defense infrastructure, border surveillance technology, and regional intelligence-sharing frameworks remains essential for mitigating the multidimensional challenges posed by external actors seeking to exploit India’s internal vulnerabilities and fragment national cohesion.

The fundamental challenge remains balancing security imperatives with democratic values, preventing radicalization through community engagement, and addressing root causes of grievance while maintaining operational capability to neutralize immediate terrorist threats originating from hostile external actors.

Internal Security