India–Australia Relations

India–Australia Relations

India-Australia today are comprehensive strategic partners anchored in shared democratic values, maritime geography in the Indo-Pacific, and converging interests in resilient supply chains, critical technologies, and regional security. The relationship has accelerated since 2020, with deeper defence interoperability, expanding trade under ECTA, and new roadmaps to scale cooperation in clean energy, education, agribusiness, and tourism. The main takeaway: the partnership is now broad-based and institutionalized, and the next phase will be defined by a full CECA trade pact, defence-industrial collaboration, critical minerals, and people-to-people mobility enabling sustained growth.

Historical evolution

Early ties emerged through Commonwealth linkages, diaspora, and education exchanges. Strategic convergences deepened in the 21st century—India’s Look East/Act East policy and Australia’s Indo-Pacific framing aligned, as did concerns about supply chain resilience and regional stability. Milestones included the 2009 Strategic Partnership, 2014 decision to resume uranium exports to India, 2020 elevation to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), and institutionalized dialogues such as the 2 Ministerial Dialogue and Defence Policy Talks. Australia’s Defence Strategic Review designated India a “top-tier security partner,” reflecting sustained strategic trust-building in recent years.

Trade and economic partnership

The Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (India–Australia ECTA), in force since late 2022, has lowered or eliminated tariffs across a wide range of goods and opened services opportunities, with Australia indicating over 85% of its goods exports by value to India are now tariff-free (rising to 90% by January 1, 2026). Bilateral merchandise trade has hovered in the mid‑$20 billions recently, with fluctuations around $24 billion during 2023–24 and 2024–25 as the composition adjusted post-ECTA and commodity prices normalized. United Nations COMTRADE tallied India’s exports to Australia at about $7.74 billion and imports from Australia at about $16.43 billion in 2024, underscoring India’s surplus in services but a merchandise deficit driven by coal and other raw materials.

Trade composition has become more complementary. India’s major exports include petroleum products, engineering goods, pharmaceuticals, textiles and apparel, and gems and jewellery; imports include mineral fuels, ores, and precious stones/metals, alongside agricultural commodities. Australia’s government notes ECTA’s tariff liberalization for Indian labour-intensive exports, and India’s preferential access for Australian raw materials and intermediates (e.g., coal, ores, wine).

Investment and new economic roadmaps are scaling commitments. Australia unveiled a New Roadmap for Australia’s Economic Engagement with India in February 2025, identifying nearly 50 opportunity areas and focusing on four “superhighways”: clean energy, education and skills, agribusiness, and tourism, with a Trade and Investment Accelerator Fund to catalyze activity. India’s official and business channels similarly underline the long-term CECA (Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement) under negotiation, targeting goods, services, digital trade, procurement, and rules of origin to lift bilateral trade substantially over the medium term.

Defence and security cooperation

Defence has become a core pillar of the CSP. Key frameworks and practices now in place include the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (2020), the 2 Ministerial Dialogue (since 2021), annual/regular Defence Policy Talks, service-to-service staff talks, and an expanding calendar of exercises and port calls.

Exercises span all three domains: AUSINDEX (naval), AUSTRAHIND (army), and frequent air exercises and visits, alongside multilateral formats like Malabar and Pitch Black. High-end interoperability has been boosted by arrangements such as the 2024 air-to-air refuelling agreement, enabling mutual in-flight refuelling to extend operational reach. Maritime domain awareness, information-sharing, defence S&T, industry linkages, and counter-IUU fishing are now structured priorities.

Institutionally, both sides have maintained momentum: the second 2 ministerial in November 2023 set directions on interoperability and maritime cooperation; secretary-level consultations in 2024, the 9th Defence Policy Talks in March 2025, and planned 2025 2 in Australia sustain a pathway toward long-term defence collaboration. Australia has invited India to Talisman Sabre 2025 and hosted Malabar for the first time; Indian platforms such as INS Vagir have visited Australia, signalling growing comfort and reach.

Sectors of strategic convergence

• Critical minerals and clean energy: Australia’s status as a leading producer of lithium, cobalt, and rare earths complements India’s energy transition and manufacturing ambitions. Joint initiatives span a Critical Minerals Investment Partnership, green hydrogen collaboration, and a Renewable Energy Partnership to structure practical projects in solar PV, storage, and hydrogen.

• Education and skills: Australia remains a major destination for Indian students. The 2025 roadmap elevates skills partnerships, vocational training, and institutional tie-ups to deepen talent pipelines and mutual recognition pathways.

• Digital and technology: ECTA and future CECA chapters on digital trade, cybersecurity cooperation through 2 mechanisms, and industry links in space and advanced manufacturing are building blocks for tech-driven growth.

• Agribusiness and tourism: Tariff cuts, SPS cooperation, and tourism facilitation feature in the roadmaps, with scope to scale two-way flows as air connectivity and visa regimes continue to improve.

• Supply chain resilience: Trilateral and Quad frameworks reinforce diversification goals, with India–Australia–Japan Supply Chain Resilience Initiative as a supporting pillar.

Recent developments (2023–October 2025)

• ECTA performance and CECA track: India and Australia marked ECTA’s second and third anniversaries with continued trade growth, while accelerating negotiations for a broader CECA to expand into services and digital, unlock procurement, and refine rules of origin.

• 2 and defence policy talks: The second 2 ministerial (Nov 2023) set an expanded agenda on interoperability, maritime domain awareness, counter-IUU fishing, and defence industry linkages. Follow-on secretary-level talks (Oct 2024) and the 9th Defence Policy Talks (Mar 2025) reviewed progress and set the stage for the 2025 ministerial in Australia.

• Air-to-air refuelling and exercises: A refuelling arrangement has been operationalized to enable mutual AAR; India participated in Australia-hosted exercises and is slated for Talisman Sabre 2025, reinforcing joint readiness in the Indo-Pacific.

• 2025 economic roadmap: Australia’s New Roadmap for 2025 highlights nearly 50 opportunities and four high-potential sectors; India and Australia also extended programs such as AIBX to support business-to-business engagement.

• Upcoming ministerial visit and new agreements: India’s Defence Minister is scheduled to visit Australia on October 9–10, 2025, with three new agreements planned in information-sharing, maritime domain cooperation, and joint activities—marking five years of the CSP and the first defence ministerial visit to Australia under the current government since 2014.

People-to-people and soft power

The Indian diaspora in Australia, student flows, tourism, and sports—especially cricket—serve as enduring bridges. Government programs like AIBX and university partnerships deepen institutional connections, while mobility frameworks and mutual recognition arrangements continue to expand opportunities for professionals and students.

Challenges and constraints

Despite momentum, several issues require management. Merchandise trade remains imbalanced due to India’s dependence on Australian resources; sectoral market access and standards/SPS questions surface periodically in agriculture and industrial products; and both sides must translate strategic alignment into investable projects at scale, particularly in critical minerals processing, defence manufacturing, and green hydrogen value chains. Coordinating export controls, dual-use technology guardrails, and consistent regulatory pathways will matter as technology and defence-industrial cooperation intensify.

Future outlook and recommendations

• Conclude a high-quality CECA: A comprehensive pact covering goods, services, digital trade, procurement, and robust origin rules can lift bilateral trade beyond $40–50 billion over the medium term, with predictable market access, mobility, and standards cooperation.

• Scale critical minerals to manufacturing: Move beyond offtake to joint processing, battery materials, and component manufacturing in India, leveraging Australia’s resource base and India’s market and manufacturing capacity; use blended finance and risk-sharing mechanisms.

• Defence-industrial and S&T co-development: Prioritize co-design and co-production for maritime surveillance systems, undersea domain awareness, MRO, and A2A refuelling ecosystem support; expand reciprocal base access under MLSA-enabled logistics with shared MDA architectures.

• Green energy and hydrogen corridors: Operationalize the Renewable Energy Partnership and Green Hydrogen Taskforce into pilot shipments, electrolyser manufacturing, and ammonia bunkering projects; align certification, safety, and offtake contracts.

• Education, skills, and mobility: Create multi-campus joint degrees, mutual qualification recognition in priority trades, and streamlined mobility for researchers and tech professionals; expand AIBX-like platforms for SMEs.

• Maritime security and blue economy: Enhance Quad/AIIPOIP cooperation on maritime domain awareness, IUU fishing enforcement, resilient port logistics, and climate adaptation for coastal infrastructure.

• Tourism and cultural exchange: Grow direct routes, facilitate e-visa processes, and co-promote heritage, cricket, eco-tourism, and film to boost two-way visitor flows supporting MSMEs in both countries.

Conclusion

The India–Australia relationship now spans strategic, economic, technological, and societal domains with strong institutional scaffolding. ECTA has created a baseline for trade expansion; 2, MLSA, and regular exercises have built ningful defence interoperability; and the 2025 roadmap identifies practical sectors to scale. The next leap—anchored in CECA, defence co-development, critical minerals value chains, and mobility—can turn complementarities into durable joint capabilities and inclusive growth for the Indo-Pacific. Continued high-level visits and imminent new agreements in maritime information-sharing and joint activities underscore the partnership’s trajectory toward deeper, operational cooperation in the years ahead.

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